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Abstract 
 
The globalization of accounting standards as seen through the proliferation of 
IFRS worldwide is one of the most important developments in corporate governance over 
the last decade. I offer an analysis of some international political dynamics of countries’ 
IFRS  harmonization  decisions.  The  analysis  is  based  on  field  studies  in  three 
jurisdictions: Canada, China, and India. Across these jurisdictions, I first describe unique 
elements  of  domestic  political  economies  that  are  shaping  IFRS  policies.  Then,  I 
inductively  isolate  two  principal  dimensions  that  can  be  used  to  characterize  the 
jurisdictions’ IFRS responses: proximity to existing political powers at the IASB; and 
own potential political power at the IASB. Based on how countries are classified along 
these dimensions, I offer predictions, ceteris paribus, on countries’ IFRS harmonization 
strategies. The analysis and framework in this paper can help broaden the understanding 
of accounting’s globalization.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The globalization of accounting standards through the development and growth, 
since 2001, of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is one of the 
most important phenomena in corporate governance today. In an ironic twist to its 
staid  perception  in  popular  culture,  accounting  has  been  at  the  forefront  of 
globalization:  ahead  in  its  efforts  to  converge  standards  internationally  when 
compared to other related areas such as product quality standards, occupational 
safety  standards,  environmental  standards,  securities  law,  immigration  reform, 
etc. Since the early 2000s, several countries, particularly member-states of the 
European Union (EU), have embarked on a project to unite globally divergent 
accounting standards into one common set of accounting principles, IFRS. As of 
2010, about 100 countries, including all of the world’s major economies, either 
have adopted IFRS, or have initiated an IFRS harmonization program, or have in 
place some national strategy to respond to IFRS.  
Over  the  2001–2010  period,  countries  have  varied  in  the  degree  and 
timing of their commitment to IFRS. There are a number of plausible hypotheses 
for  this  variation,  including  cultural  differences,  differences  in  corporate 
governance environments, technological differences, and differences in countries’ 
natural resources.
1 In this paper, I investigate how some of these fundamental 
jurisdictional differences manifest into international political dynamics that can 
contribute to countries’ responses to IFRS. Through in-depth field studies across 
three jurisdictions—Canada, China, and India—I develop a framework that can 
help  characterize  the  international  political  dynamics  of  the  globalization  of 
accounting standards. The framework is represented by a two-dimensional matrix, 
where: one dimension represents a jurisdiction’s proximity to existing political 
powers at the IFRS’ rule-making body, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB); and the other dimension represents a jurisdiction’s own potential 
political  power  at  the  IASB.  The  framework  can  help  explain  and  predict 
countries’ decisions on IFRS harmonization and can yield insights into the nature 
of IFRS itself and its potential structure in the future.  
I begin my analysis by first briefly providing (in Section 2, “Background”) 
some theoretical basis for my study of “international politics” and “power.” To do 
this,  I  connect  the  study  to  the  related  literatures  on  the  political  process  in 
accounting,  on  political  economy,  and  on  international  relations.  Across  these 
literatures, the terms “politics” and “power” have many interpretations (based on 
the  underlying  branch  of  social  science—economics,  political  science,  or 
sociology); I am agnostic on these definitions because they do not detract from 
                                                 
1 On the complementarities of accounting standards with local institutions, see, for example, Ball, 
Kothari, and Robin (2000), Ball (2006), and Leuz (2010). Ramanna and Sletten (2009) discuss 
hypotheses on the degree and timing of countries’ IFRS harmonization.  2 
 
the  study’s  conclusions.  But  for  clarity,  “politics”  can  be  understood  as  the 
deliberative  (i.e.,  non-price-based)  allocation  of  scare  resources  (in  this  case, 
IFRS  standard  setting)  across  entities  with  heterogeneous  preferences.  The 
politics  here  is  “international”  because  the  “entities”  are  countries.
2  One 
interpretation  of  political  “power”  is  the  ability  of  an  entity  to  further  its 
preferences in a deliberative allocation through sanctions (or threats thereof) on 
another (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1993). 
In addition to theoretical background, Section 2 provides a background to 
the development of IFRS over its first decade, particularly examining the role of 
Britain and the EU in the establishment and subsequent direction of the IASB. 
This description is important to my study because it helps establish the existing 
political  power  base  at  the  IASB,  against  which  other  jurisdictions’  IFRS 
harmonization responses can be evaluated. I survey the historical evidence on the 
IASB’s first decade and conclude that the IASB has been, since its inception, 
legitimized by the EU embrace of IFRS and defined by, in particular, British 
interests. For example, Britain had a formative role in the predecessor institutions 
to the IASB (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007), and there is anecdotal evidence from 
modifications to IFRS at the behest of certain large EU member states during the 
2008–09 financial crisis suggesting that preserving the EU’s reliance on IFRS is 
an important source of legitimacy for the IASB. (There are, of course, differences 
within the EU on the direction and desirability of IFRS, which I discuss in the 
paper; but, for the most part, these differences are subsumed in my treatment of 
the EU as a single entity. The advantage of this treatment is that it allows for a 
richer exploration of the international political dynamics of non-EU countries’ 
approaches to IFRS—the politics of the EU being well studied.
3 I elaborate on 
this point in Section 2.)   
In the context of the IASB’s British origins and EU mandate, Canada’s 
decision  to  adopt  IFRS  provides  important  insights.  In  2005,  faced  with 
increasingly  globalized  product  and  capital  markets,  and  with  the  growing 
popularity  of  IFRS  across  the  globe,  Canadian  capital  market  regulators 
considered abandoning their domestic accounting standards for IFRS (Canada had 
been involved in efforts to develop international accounting standards since the 
1970s).  A  significant  fraction  of  Canadian  industry  (especially  oil  and  gas 
companies), however, opposed this idea, arguing instead that Canada adopt U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). With over 80% of its exports 
being U.S. bound, and over 60% of its foreign equity portfolio investment from 
the United States, the position that Canada adopt U.S. GAAP had strong merits. 
                                                 
2  In  using  countries  as  the  unit  of  analysis,  I  subsume  the  domestic  political  economies  that 
generate country-level responses into intra-national forces. See Section 2.   
3 See for example, Leuz, Pfaff, and Hopwood (2005), Benston, Bromwich, Litan, and Wagenhofer 
(2006), and Botzem (2012).  3 
 
Nevertheless,  Canadian  regulators  decided  to  embrace  IFRS.  The  Canadian 
decision  is  interesting  in  that  it  bucked  economic  arguments  for  U.S.  GAAP 
adoption and put Canadian capital markets at the discretion of rules set by the 
London-based IASB.
4 Section 3, “Junior allies: the case of Canada,” explores this 
counter-intuitive decision. Ultimately, I identify two non-market forces as likely 
contributing  to  the  decision:  (1)  Canadian  comfort  with  the  IASB’s  Anglo-
centrism, particularly when viewed in the context of longstanding cultural ties 
with Britain; and (2) Canada’s resonant desire to distinguish itself from the United 
States, despite its strong cultural ties to that country (in light of what the Canadian 
media has described as an “inferiority complex” vis-à-vis America).  
Contrasting Canada’s near complete commitment to IFRS, China’s IFRS 
approach highlights the result of political compromises in the IFRS harmonization 
process.  (Unlike  Canadian  “adoption”  of  IFRS,  since  2006,  China  has  issued 
IFRS  “converged”  domestic  accounting  standards.
5)  This  issue  is  discussed  in 
Section  4,  “Towards  a  multipolar  IASB:  the  case  of  China.”  Citing  China’s 
“unique  circumstances,”  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF)  in  Beijing  has  been 
careful to customize IFRS to its needs where expedient. For instance, given state 
ownership of a substantial proportion of Chinese companies, the MOF noted that 
many state entities were likely to be subject to extensive related-party disclosure 
requirements under a strict interpretation of IFRS. Arguing against the onerous 
nature of such compliance, the MOF was able to successfully lobby the IASB to 
modify IFRS so that its state-owned enterprises were not subject to the same level 
of  related-party  disclosures  as  most  other  companies  across  the  world.  The 
substantive element of this victory is significant because the disclosure of related-
party transactions is central to maintaining the integrity of the “entity concept,” 
the fundamental idea in accounting that an enterprise’s financials are its own. On 
a procedural level, the victory can be indicative of the MOF’s growing power at 
the IASB and its ability to shape IFRS in the future.  
While the Chinese government has been successful in making its voice 
heard at the IASB, the ability of other emerging markets to do so is less clear. 
This issue is the focus of Section 5, “Bigger fish from smaller ponds: the case of 
Tata Steel in India.” Tata Steel is a large Indian multinational with extensive 
European  operations  funded  by  euro  denominated  debt.  This  natural  hedge 
notwithstanding, Tata Steel is required under IFRS rules to translate the debt into 
its home currency, Indian rupees, for consolidated reporting purposes. Given the 
                                                 
4  Technically,  an  IFRS  standard  must  be  included  in  the  Canadian  Institute  of  Chartered 
Accountants’ Handbook in order to be considered Canadian GAAP. Thus, Canada has an “opt-in” 
rather  than  an  “opt-out”  mechanism  to  IFRS  harmonization,  which  could  make  it  easier  for 
Canada to reject an IFRS standard in the future should the need arise.  
5 The distinction between “adoption” and “convergence” colors the IFRS response strategies of 
several other countries, e.g., Japan. See Section 7.   4 
 
rupee’s volatility, the IFRS translation requirement exposes Tata Steel’s financial 
statements to substantial mechanical swings (about 64% of net income in 2009), 
affecting its financial covenants and its ability to raise further capital. I discuss the 
challenges faced by Tata Steel in organizing a response to the problem above. I 
conclude that concerns such as those faced by Tata Steel can help explain India’s 
decision to defer its IFRS convergence project twice in the past two years. The 
Tata  case  study  has  implications  for  the  IFRS  response  strategies  of  other 
countries with similar or less international power than India.  
The country analyses outlined above can be used to induce a framework to 
analyze  how  international  politics  can  shape  countries’  strategies  on  IFRS 
harmonization (Figure 3, Section 6). The framework is characterized by a two-
dimensional matrix where: (i) one axis represents a country’s proximity to the 
existing political powers at the IASB; and (ii) the other axis a country’s potential 
political power, i.e., its ability to shape decisions at the IASB. In (i), “proximity” 
is essentially a measure of cultural distance, where “culture” is defined as a set of 
shared  beliefs  and  preferences  across  entities  (e.g.,  Fernández,  2008).  For 
example, Canada, with its British roots, scores high on the proximity dimension. 
China, for reasons briefly illustrated above, scores high on the second dimension, 
potential  political  power.  In  Section  6,  “The  international  politics  of  IFRS 
harmonization,”  I  discuss  how  a  classification  of  countries  along  the  two 
dimensions can be used to help explain and predict their IFRS response strategies 
on the basis of international political dynamics. Specifically, ceteris paribus, I 
expect: (1) countries scoring high on the first dimension but low on the second 
(i.e., countries with high proximity to the existing IASB political powers, but low 
potential  political  power,  e.g.,  New  Zealand)  are  likely  to  embrace  IFRS  (as 
Canada has); (2) countries scoring low on the first dimension but high on the 
second (e.g., Japan) are likely to develop expedient exceptions as part of their 
IFRS response strategy (as China has); and (3) countries scoring low on both 
dimensions are likely to either slow IFRS harmonization (as India has) or work in 
regional  coalitions  to  gain  a  stronger  voice  in  IASB  decision  making  (as 
Singapore has). In this section, I also briefly discuss the special case of the United 
States on IFRS harmonization. The United States is at once one of the IASB’s 
most  powerful  constituents  and  most  reluctant  endorsers,  a  contradiction  that 
reflects its unique role in IFRS international politics.  
There  are  both  practical  and  academic  implications  of  the  framework 
described above that I briefly address in Section 7, “Discussion.” On practical 
implications,  I  discuss  how  the  paper’s  framework  can  relate  to  the  IASB’s 
strategy  to  encourage  “full  adoption”  over  “convergence”  among  potential 
harmonizing  jurisdictions  and  to  the  IASB’s  own  organizational  reforms  to 
increase  the  board’s  geographical  diversity.  I  expect  both  the  “full  adoption” 
strategy and the organizational reforms to increase the role of power politics in 5 
 
IFRS  standard  setting.  On  academic  implications,  I  connect  the  paper’s 
framework to what, I argue, is likely to be the central question in IFRS standard-
setting  research  going  forward—‘Is  the  political  process  underlying  IFRS 
facilitating the production of economically efficient standards?’ 
A brief note on the paper’s research methodology is in order. The paper 
has  three  objectives:  (1)  to  describe  salient  elements  influencing  the  IFRS 
harmonization  process  in  three  field  sites—Canada,  China,  and  India;  (2)  to 
isolate  from  these  descriptions  dimensions  of  international  politics  in  the 
countries’ harmonization decisions; and (3) to offer predictions and explanations 
for other countries’ decisions on IFRS harmonization. In this sense, the paper 
focuses  on  “moving  from  bottom  to  top”  in  “three  steps—observation, 
categorization  and  association,”  and  thus  can  be  said  to  follow  an  “inductive 
theory  building  process”  (Carlile  and  Christensen,  2004,  p.  4,  emphasis  in 
original).  The  inductive  approach  is  “positive”  because  it  presupposes  an 
epistemology that empirical reality “can be studied through objective categories” 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 822);
6 but it is distinct from much of the other 
positive  IFRS-related  literature  that  is  most  commonly  large-sample  statistical 
(i.e., “top to bottom” deductive research). 
I conclude with a caveat: While the dimensions of international political 
dynamics  outlined  in  this  paper  can  have  explanatory  power  in  understanding 
countries’ IFRS harmonization decisions, they are not intended to be exhaustive. 
Big  4  audit  firms,  large  global  financial  firms,  and  multinational  industrial 
companies  may  impact  international  political  dynamics  independent  of  the 
country-level forces highlighted herein.
7 Moreover, “international politics” is not 
the only element in understanding the proliferation of IFRS. Thus, the framework 
presented here is at best a “partial equilibrium” analysis.  
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Related theory 
 
There is a robust literature on the political process in accounting, in the historical 
(e.g.,  Zeff,  1972),  the  economic  (e.g.,  Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1978),  and  the 
sociological  traditions  (e.g.,  Power,  1992).  The  ‘qualitative’  literature  has 
                                                 
6 Thus, although the paper’s “domain” is the field, it is distinct from “qualitative” field research, 
which presupposes “emergent, subjective, and constructed properties” in the data (Ahrens and 
Chapman).   
7 There is an evolving literature on the role of private actors, such as the Big 4 auditors, in IFRS 
harmonization that is complementary to the analysis herein: See, for example, Botzem and Quack 
(2009) and references therein, particularly, Perry and Nölke (2005); also, Perry and Nölke (2006). 6 
 
approached the political process as ‘emergent,’ arguing that a standard-setting 
institution  both  responds  to  and  “contributes  to  changes  in  [its]  environment” 
(e.g., Young, 1994, p. 84).  By contrast, the ‘positive’ literature has attempted to 
find deterministic relations in standard setting, mostly through a focus on firms 
and auditors as the unit of analysis (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1982; Puro, 
1984),  although  there  are  also  studies  that  investigate  the  effects  of  other 
standard-setting constituencies such as politicians (e.g., Ramanna, 2008) and the 
standard setters themselves (e.g., Allen and Ramanna, 2012). A key objective of 
the  literature  is  to  describe  and  understand  the  determination  of  national 
accounting  standards,  a  process  that  is  “political”  (rather  than  “economic”) 
because  it  involves  allocating  scarce  resources  (by  establishing  rules)  across 
entities with heterogeneous preferences through a deliberative (i.e., non-market) 
process. Outcomes of the deliberative resource-allocation process are affected by 
the entities’ differing (political) power, where such “power” can be understood as 
“the ability of furthering one’s interests by imposing (or credibly threatening to 
impose) sanctions on another [entity] when the converse is not also true” (Bowles 
and Gintis, 1993, p. 88).
8 In a utilitarian sense, insights into the political process 
of accounting are informative because they shed light on whether accounting is 
likely to facilitate allocative efficiency in a capitalist economy. 
In this tradition of political studies in accounting, I offer an analysis of 
international politics in IFRS harmonization. There are two important distinctions 
between this analysis and much of the political literature in accounting. First, the 
analysis is “international.” This means that the “political process” is not contained 
within relatively well-defined government institutions such as legislative or legal 
authority, which can afford a procedural “legitimacy.”
9 International politics, as 
the literature in international relations has observed (e.g., Büthe and Mattli, 2011), 
often  occurs  outside  the  rules  or  norms  established  by  governments  and  their 
laws.  This  lack  of  procedural  legitimacy  makes  it  difficult  to  evaluate  the 
allocative efficiency of outcomes from an international political process. 
Second, the analysis is at the level of “countries.” While this is common in 
the literatures on international relations and international corporate governance 
(e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008), it is by no means necessary 
to a study of international politics, as seen in the some of IFRS literature (e.g., 
Perry and Nölke, 2005; Büthe and Mattli, 2011; Botzem, 2012) and in the broader 
                                                 
8 The Bowles and Gintis definition of “power” uses the vocabulary of neoclassical economics. A 
broader, sociological definition of power is provided by Weber (1947): “the probability that one 
actor  within  a  social  relationship  would  be  in  a  position  to  carry  out  his  own  will  despite 
resistance.” Also see Hope and Gray (1982) for an examination of political “power” in accounting 
standard-setting.  
9 Hurrell (2005, p. 16) defines “legitimacy” as resulting in rule following that is “distinguishable 
from purely self-interested or instrumental behavior on the one hand, and from straightforward 
imposed or coercive rule on the other.” 7 
 
literature on the politics of multinational corporations.
10 Moreover, most of the 
accounting  literature  on  IFRS  is  at  the  firm  level.  But  countries  as  a  unit  of 
analysis  are  useful  to  studying  accounting  globalization  because  eventually 
decisions about requiring, permitting, or eschewing IFRS for companies are made 
at the country level (usually by a public authority or a public-mandate agency). Of 
course, country-level decisions reflect domestic political economies, which are 
driven in part by the relative preferences and power of local firms, politicians, and 
standard setters, as the following sections on Canada, China, and India illustrate. 
Further,  the  existence  and  nature  of  local  procedural  institutions  such  public 
hearings  or  industry  clubs  can  also  affect  country-level  outcomes.
11  In  using 
countries as the unit of analysis, I subsume the domestic political economies that 
generate country-level responses into intra-national forces. Thus, I argue, I can 
isolate dimensions of “international politics” for use in cross-country comparative 
studies.   
 
2.2. Institutional background: British and EU centrality to the IASB 
 
This subsection briefly surveys the evidence on EU and, in particular, British 
centrality to the IASB’s origins and development. The objective is to establish the 
IASB’s core political identity, which is useful in the comparative analysis that 
follows.  
The development of national accounting “standards” is itself a relatively 
recent phenomenon (e.g., Baxter, 1981), dating only to the post-World War II era, 
so the internationalization of accounting standards is still more recent.
12 An early 
systematic attempt at harmonizing standards across borders was the Accountants 
International Study Group (AISG), established in 1967. Three countries, Canada, 
the UK, and the United States, were part of this effort, which involved comparing 
the jurisdictions’ accounting and auditing practices with a view towards reducing 
differences (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 30).  
Paralleling  the  development  of  the  AISG,  were  efforts  within  the 
European Economic Community (of which the UK was not as yet a member) at 
accounting standards harmonization. These efforts had made significant progress 
by 1973 when the UK joined the EEC. In part to ensure its voice in European 
accounting harmonization in light of already established Continental momentum 
                                                 
10 On the politics of multinational corporations, Nye (1974) is an early study. More recently in 
accounting, Humphrey, Loft, and Woods (2009) study the interplay of large audit firms and the 
“international financial architecture” during the 2008–09 financial crisis.  
11 On the role of procedural institutions, see, for example, Richardson’s (2009) network-centric 
study of the Canadian accounting establishment.  
12  Baxter  makes  the  distinction  between  pre-War  U.S.  GAAP  that  generally  reflected  the 
codification of widely accepted accounting practices, and post-War U.S. accounting “standards” 
that were motivated from conceptual ideas and thus did not always reflect existing practice.  8 
 
in this regard, the UK led in the establishment of a new group, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the same year (Benston et al., 2006, p. 
229).
13  
The IASC marked a major development in the globalization of accounting 
standards.  The  London-based  IASC  was  an  association  of  the  professional 
accountancy bodies from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, and the United States. The IASC was explicitly 
concerned with narrowing differences in accounting practices across its member 
states, a task it saw as important in light of increasing international trade (e.g., 
Camfferman  and  Zeff,  2007).  The  IASC  had  no  specific  intergovernmental 
mandate  and  no  statutory  enforcement  authority.  Perhaps  in  light  of  these 
limitations, the IASC focused on developing broad accounting principles with an 
eye  on  influencing  jurisdiction-based  accounting  regulations,  rather  than  on 
creating international accounting standards per se (e.g., Donnelly, 2010, p. 229).  
By  the  1990s,  there  was  growing  consensus  that  the  IASC’s  indirect 
approach to globalizing accounting standards was insufficient (Camfferman and 
Zeff, 2007, p. 447). The idea of a professionally organized, technocratic standard-
setting  institution,  with  a  direct  objective  to  produce  common  worldwide 
accounting rules, came to take root. Early in the new millennium, the IASB was 
born.  
The London-based IASB had from the beginning the EU’s backing. The 
European  Commission  (EC),  which  was  already  pushing  for  a  single  set  of 
accounting  standards  across  its  “common  market,”  wanted  to  play  a  more 
important role in the worldwide harmonization of financial reporting and thus 
avoid U.S. dominance of this process (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 17). In 
2000, the EC designated the as-yet-unborn IASB its de facto standard setter, and 
in  2002,  the  European  Parliament  required  all  EU-listed  companies  to  report 
under IFRS from 2005 (European Parliament, 2002).
14 The first IASB chairman 
was Britain’s then chief accounting standard setter, David Tweedie.  
Just as EU and, in particular, British interests were central to the IASB’s 
foundation, these interests continued to shape the IASB’s development through its 
first decade. A palpable example of the EU’s centrality to the IASB came during 
the 2008–09 financial crisis. The issue at hand was IAS 39 and IFRS 7, the extant 
international standards on measurement, recognition, and disclosure of financial 
                                                 
13 Camfferman and Zeff (Ch. 3) discuss other motives behind the formation of the IASC. Their 
discussion highlights the UK’s central role, particularly through the activities of Lord Benson, 
president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, whom they describe as 
(p. 44) “the guiding spirit behind the founding of the IASC.”  
14  Technically,  the  EU  maintains  an  independent  process  to  evaluate  each  IFRS.  Due  to 
modifications that can emerge in this process, the EU-version of IFRS is not identical to that 
issued by the IASB.  9 
 
instruments. The standards did not provide companies the flexibility to reclassify 
financial instruments hitherto accounted for using fair values to a historical cost 
basis. This situation considerably inconvenienced several major European banks 
at the height of the financial crisis when the fair values of many asset classes were 
depressed. The banks argued that certain assets (including mortgage-based assets) 
were expected to be held for very long periods, so transitory depressions in their 
fair values should not affect bank balance sheets. They sought a reclassification of 
these assets to a cost basis.
15  
Buttressing the banks’ claim was a similar reclassification provision in 
U.S. GAAP (e.g., Christoffersen, 2008). Arguing for a “level playing field” with 
the Americans, the EC’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council, under pressure 
from major players in the European banking industry, called on the IASB on 
October 7, 2008 to address the issue (EC, 2008). On October 8, the EC president 
threatened  legislation  to  create  a  European  carve-out  from  IFRS  on 
reclassification, a move that could have subverted the IASB’s legitimacy in the 
midst  of  the  financial  crisis.  On  October  13,  the  IASB  rushed  through 
amendments that gave the banks the ability to reclassify previously fair-valued 
assets  to  a  cost  basis,  a  decision  backdated  to  July  1.
16  The  decision  likely 
compromised the IASB’s emerging reputation for due process in decision making 
(e.g., Leone, 2008). While the EC’s influence over the IASB in this matter was 
not unequivocal, it is pertinent to note that the IASB—at some damage to itself—
hurriedly caved to the EC’s threat of subverting IFRS on the subject.    
Evidence on the EU’s centrality to the IASB can also be seen in more 
formal empirical tests. For example, Ramanna and Sletten (2011) conduct a study 
to test for the presence of network effects in the decisions of over 90 non-EU 
countries  to  adopt  IFRS.  They  find  robust  evidence  consistent  with  network 
effects. Interestingly, they find that (p. 27) “network benefits expected to accrue 
from economic relations with the EU” are a “dominant” source of the network 
effects. This latter conclusion is especially true for larger countries. The authors 
cite the anecdotal evidence from Skinner’s (2008) work on Japan as consistent 
with this conclusion. Skinner (p. 220) notes that IFRS harmonization attempts in 
Japan  arose  from  pressure  to  “convince”  the  EU  “that  Japanese  GAAP  was 
‘equivalent’  to  IFRS,”  since  “Japanese  companies  rely  heavily  on  European 
capital markets for external debt financing.” 
The historical, political, and empirical evidence briefly discussed above 
are consistent with the EU and, in particular, Britain being central to the origin 
and development of the IASB. This conclusion is not particularly controversial, 
but establishing it is important to the following analysis. The IASB’s European 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Norris (2010) and the discussion and citations in Laux and Leuz (2009).  
16 Reclassifying entities were required to disclose in footnotes results absent reclassification.   10 
 
identity  institutes  a  baseline  against  which  other  jurisdictions’  IFRS 
harmonization responses can be evaluated.  
There  are,  of  course,  limitations  to  treating  Britain  and  the  EU  as  a 
common unit; particularly given that EC decisions are often not unanimous and 
that Continental European accounting traditions are sometimes at odds with those 
in Britain. In fact, on some dimensions, British accounting traditions—e.g., in 
their  relation  to  the  Common  Law—are  closer  to  U.S.  GAAP  than  European 
accounting  practices.  However,  at  least  since  2005,  IFRS  has  been  applied 
universally through the EU (including Britain), so it is reasonable to treat the 
region as a common accounting jurisdiction. Similarly, on the issue of discord 
within the EU on the direction of IFRS, this is certainly an active area for study; 
but viewed at a global level from an extro-Europe perspective, particularly over 
the  IASB’s  first  decade,  the  EU  remains  a  useful  jurisdictional  unit  for  an 
international comparative study. (I return to the issue of intra-EU discords on 
IFRS in Section 7) In other words, acknowledging that the EU is not a monolith 
and that differences within the EU warrant much attention, I argue that EU’s 
collective embrace of IFRS, together with the evidence on the EU’s role in the 
origins and development of the IASB merit the approach used in this section. 
Doing so allows for a richer exploration of the international political dynamics of 
non-EU countries’ approaches to IFRS, which follows.       
 
 
3. Junior allies: the case of Canada 
 
3.1. The economic rationale for globalizing Canadian accounting standards  
 
In January 2006, the Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) of Canada announced 
that  it  would  initiate  a  formal  process  of  converging  Canadian  accounting 
standards with those of the IASB so that from January 2011, Canadian companies 
would effectively be reporting under IFRS (CICA, 2006). The decision was a 
major  commitment  by  Canada—one  of  the  world’s  largest  industrialized 
economies—to  the  IASB  and  its  standards.  Of  particular  note  was  Canada’s 
decision to embrace IFRS wholeheartedly, i.e., without exceptions or limitations. 
Speaking  of  the  decision,  Paul  Cherry,  the  then  head  of  the  AcSB  noted 
(Ramanna and Cheng, 2009, p. 7), “Once you say change, shades of gray don’t 
matter a whole lot.” The timing of Canada’s commitment—shortly after EU-listed 
companies  began  using  IFRS-based  standards,  but  before  most  major  non-
European countries had made a similar commitment—was significant because it 
signaled  an  endorsement  of  the  international  accounting  standards  when  their 
future remained uncertain. 11 
 
Also  noteworthy  in  Canada’s  commitment  to  IFRS  was  its  decision  to 
forgo  the  accounting  standards  of  its  closest  neighbor  and  largest  trade  and 
investment partner, the United States. Throughout the process that led up to the 
AcSB’s  January  2006  decision,  U.S.  GAAP  had  been  a  serious  contender  as 
Canada  looked  for  a  globally  relevant  alternative  to  its  domestic  standards 
(Canadian companies cross-listed in the United States were permitted to use U.S. 
GAAP for domestic reporting).  
Canada’s decision to globalize its accounting regime was born of domestic 
concerns that Canada did not have the scale to support its own unique accounting 
regulatory regime. Speaking on this issue Mr. Cherry noted (Ramanna and Cheng, 
2009, p. 7), “Our decision is based very much on what we think is the economic 
reality of the moment and foreseeable future. Canadian markets are, if you are 
being charitable, about 3% of the global marketplace. It has become increasingly 
difficult to make foreign investors comfortable, in the sense of understanding, the 
Canadian accounting system that we have in place. It is very expensive to educate 
others. The choices are simple: it’s either U.S. GAAP or international standards.” 
The  Canadian  economy  in  2005  was  heavily  reliant  on  foreign  trade, 
which accounted for almost three quarters of the country’s total gross domestic 
product  (GDP).  This  represented  a  significant  increase  from  the  early  1990s, 
when foreign trade represented about half of GDP. The growing reliance on trade 
underscored  a  broader  trend  towards  an  increasingly  globalized  Canadian 
economy.  For  example,  Canada’s  capital  markets  were  in  2005  also  highly 
internationalized, with high levels of foreign direct investment (representing more 
than 30% of GDP) and foreign portfolio investment (about 37% of GDP).
17 
The  United  States  was  Canada’s  largest  trade  and  investment  partner, 
accounting for roughly 84% of its total exports, 56% of its total imports, and 
almost  two-thirds  of  total  foreign  portfolio  investment  in  2005.  And  although 
Canada’s dependence on the United States had been decreasing in recent years 
(largely  due  to  growing  commerce  with  the  EU  and  China),  Canada’s  U.S.-
reliance remained overwhelming. 
Given America’s significant role in the Canadian economy, the option to 
embrace U.S. GAAP as a global alternative to Canadian GAAP was popular in 
some quarters. For example, several important players in the Canadian oil and gas 
industry—one of Canada’s largest industries—actively lobbied for U.S. GAAP 
adoption through 2005 (e.g., Ramanna and Cheng, 2009).
18 In fact, since the early 
1990s the AcSB had worked to keep Canadian GAAP aligned with U.S. GAAP to 
the extent possible, so the full adoption of U.S. GAAP seemed a logical next step 
to these players.   
                                                 
17 Data compiled from the International Monetary Fund, Statistics Canada, and the World Bank. 
18 Several of the largest Canadian oil and gas companies are subsidiaries of U.S. counterparts.  12 
 
Among those arguing against U.S. GAAP were the global auditing firms. 
A  comment  letter  on  the  issue  from  Deloitte  summarized  this  opposition 
(Ramanna and Cheng, 2009, p. 16): “…efforts to harmonize [Canadian GAAP] 
with the U.S. would continue to produce standards of increasing complexity… 
Such a path is not likely in the best interest of Canadian capital markets and is 
certainly not in the best interest of Canadian non-public companies. Accordingly, 
we support the exploration of a different model: one that permits those who wish 
to use U.S. GAAP [the option] to do so, [and] the adoption of IFRS as Canadian 
GAAP…”
19 Another argument against U.S. GAAP adoption in Canada was the 
ongoing harmonization project between the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and the IASB; although it was not clear that the United States 
would ever fully adopt IFRS, the existence of a harmonization project suggested 
that  the  differences  between  American  and  international  standards  would  be 
actively addressed. Moreover, unlike with the IASB, which had been working to 
solicit Canadian adoption of IFRS, there was no similar attempt on part of the 
U.S. standard-setting establishment, nor was there a practical procedure in place 
for Canadian interests to be represented in the political process of U.S. GAAP. 
Surveying the economic conditions and political climate in Canada in 2005 does 
not yield a clear prediction on Canada’s decision to adopt IFRS over U.S. GAAP. 
Thus,  in  the  following  subsection,  I  explore  some  additional  hypotheses,  in 
particular those based on cultural sentiments, as an explanation for the decision.  
 
3.2. Cultural explanations for Canada’s IFRS adoption  
 
Canada has a strong system of formalized accounting and corporate governance 
practices  dating  back  to  the  early  20th  century.  The  Canadian  accounting 
establishment is generally recognized as being of high quality: for example, a 
2005  IMD  report  ranked  Canada  as  having  one  of  the  most  highly  regarded 
accounting  establishments  in  the  world  (see  www.worldcompetitiveness.com). 
These  systems  have  their  origins  in  Canada’s  status  as  a  former  colony  and 
dependency of the British Crown. The early structure of the accounting profession 
in  Canada  closely  followed  British  traditions,  as  they  were  set  up  under  the 
guidance of such frameworks as the British Companies Act of 1900 (e.g., Baylin, 
MacDonald, and Richardson, 1996). The British influence on Canadian corporate 
                                                 
19 The opposition of global auditing firms to U.S. GAAP is not restricted to Canada and not 
particular to U.S. GAAP, i.e., global auditing firms can be seen as promoting IFRS over local 
standards in all jurisdictions studied in this paper. There are at least two plausible reasons for this 
observation: (1) global auditing firms see one worldwide standard (such as IFRS) as lowering 
operating costs for themselves; (2) global auditing firms have greater relative influence at the 
IASB than at national standard-setting bodies, because their opposing interests at the IASB are 
more dispersed. On the latter point, see, for example, Botzem and Quack (2009).  13 
 
governance  practices  is  also  evident:  for  example,  Canadian  principles  of 
corporate disclosure were initially developed in compliance with the 1844 British 
law on joint stock companies (Gray and Kitching, 2005).  
The  UK  also  remains  closely  associated  with  Canada  in  areas  outside 
accounting and corporate governance. Canada is a founding member of the British 
Commonwealth (the 1926 Imperial Commonwealth) and the UK’s sovereign is 
still  nominally  Canada’s  head  of  state.  Other  evidence  of  Canada’s  close 
association with Britain can be seen in the incorporation of elements of the Union 
Jack in the flags of several Canadian provinces and in the incorporation of Queen 
Elizabeth II’s image on Canadian legal tender. And, as recently as August 2011, 
the Canadian government decided to reinstate the “colonial” names for its navy 
and  air  force,  designating  them  as  “royal”  forces  in  tribute  to  Elizabeth  II’s 
diamond jubilee (e.g., Hopper, 2011).
20 Generally, then, with the exception of 
Québec (a former French colony), Canadians are familiar and comfortable with 
British institutions. 
This familiarity with British institutions could have eased Canada through 
any anxieties over adopting the London-based IASB as its de facto accounting 
standard setter, particularly at that early stage (2006) when IFRS’ future remained 
unclear. As discussed earlier, the IASB’s origins can be traced back to British 
interests, and Britain, together with the rest of the EU, remains central to the 
IASB, as a lead underwriter.  
In contrast to Canada’s relationship with Britain, its relationship with the 
United States, despite strong economic ties, is more nuanced. While Canada and 
the Unites States enjoy substantial cultural exchange and share many substantive 
practices (including a Common Law tradition), several commentators have noted 
that the power asymmetry between Canada and its much larger neighbor to the 
south  has  engendered  a  Canadian  national  “inferiority  complex”  vis-à-vis  the 
United  States.  Moreover,  acknowledgment  of  this  inferiority  complex  is  both 
longstanding (dating at least to the 1940s) and public (e.g., Denison, 1949; CBC 
News,  2010).  In  a  widely  cited  tongue-in-cheek  remark  on  the  U.S.-Canada 
relationship, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau noted at the Washington Press 
Club in 1969 (CBC Archives, 1969), “Living next to you is in some ways like 
sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, 
if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.” 
Thus, despite strong economic reasons for Canada to choose U.S. GAAP 
over  IFRS—and  attendant  domestic  political  pressure  from  some  Canadian 
corporations—cultural  factors,  in  particular  the  longstanding  Anglo-Canadian 
relationship and Canadian sensitivities over ceding sovereign rights to the United 
States, could have tipped the scales in favor of IFRS. It is noteworthy to point out, 
                                                 
20 The “royal” prefix had been dropped in the 1960s as part of reorganization and cost-cutting 
efforts.  14 
 
however,  that  some  large  Canadian  companies  with  cross-listings  in  U.S. 
exchanges have chosen to maintain their financial reports in compliance with U.S. 
GAAP  rather  than  switch  to  IFRS  (e.g.,  Johnson,  2010).  This  development 
suggests that the identity politics that shaped Canada’s nationwide response to 
accounting globalization were insufficient to overcome, in at least some instances, 
economic incentives at the firm level to report under American standards.   
 
 
4. Towards a multipolar IASB: the case of China 
 
4.1. China’s unique economic motives for IFRS adoption  
 
Starting in the late 1970s, a series of reforms undertaken by the Chinese central 
government transformed that country from a centrally planned socialist economy 
into an export-driven powerhouse that grew at a 15% average annual growth rate. 
As a result of this growth, by 2010 China was the world’s second largest economy 
(behind only the United States). Chinese exports totaled more than $1.5 trillion 
that year (making it the world’s largest exporter), up from $195 billion in 1999.
21 
In 2001, China was accepted into the World Trade Organization (WTO), a sign of 
its  emergence  from  economic  isolationism  into  one  of  the  world’s  foremost 
traders.   
And while exports played a central role in the thirty-year story of China’s 
spectacular  growth,  China’s  domestic  capital  markets  remained  a  relative 
sideshow.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  shareholding  had  only  just 
reemerged  in  the  mid-1980s,  as  part  of  government  efforts  to  create  greater 
operating  efficiencies  at  state-owned  enterprises.  China’s  two  major  stock 
exchanges, located in Shanghai and Shenzhen, had a total market capitalization of 
less than $2 trillion in mid-2009, or only about ten percent of that at the New 
York Stock Exchange. Large and visible Chinese companies preferred to list or to 
have a second listing on overseas stock markets (including Hong Kong). As of 
June 2009, the market capitalization of the 65 Mainland Chinese firms listed on 
the NYSE was $1.1 trillion, or more than half the total market capitalization of 
China’s domestic stock exchanges.
22  
In part to address this deficiency in its domestic capital markets, China, in 
2005, announced plans to converge its accounting standards with IFRS. There had 
been numerous studies tying concerns with China’s weak accounting institutions 
and  questionable  corporate  reporting  to  the  stunted  development  of  its  capital 
markets (e.g., DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999; Tang, 2000). IFRS adoption was 
                                                 
21 Data from the U.S.-China Business Council. 
22 Data compiled from various sources by Ramanna, Donovan, and Dai (2009).  15 
 
expected  to  improve  accounting  quality.  In  2006,  China  introduced  new 
accounting standards that, with a few important exceptions, were based on IFRS. 
By 2008, listed companies on China’s two major stock exchanges as well as most 
of the country’s largest state-owned enterprises had already begun using the new 
standards. By 2011, all Chinese companies were expected to adopt them. 
The capital-market benefits expected to accrue from IFRS adoption are a 
common  theme  behind  countries’  decisions  to  embrace  the  standards.
23  For 
example, Canada’s decision in this regard, discussed earlier, can be tied to these 
benefits.  The  remarkable  pace  of  Chinese  adoption  of  IFRS-based  standards 
suggests,  however,  that  China  had  additional  motives  when  it  accepted 
international  accounting  standards.  One  such  motive,  unique  but  critically 
important to export-driven China, is that country’s bedevilment in international 
anti-dumping lawsuits.    
Exporters  from  low  manufacturing-cost  locations,  such  as  China,  are 
sometimes litigated in the WTO for “dumping” their products in markets where 
manufacturing costs are higher. These anti-dumping lawsuits, usually brought by 
governments of destination markets, generally allege that the exporter is selling its 
products in a destination market at below cost (to establish a presence in that 
market). To contest an anti-dumping lawsuit, the exporter must show evidence of 
its “true” cost. Such evidence is particularly difficult for Chinese manufacturers to 
provide because, per China’s WTO accession protocol, the country is classified as 
a  “non-market  economy,”  and  as  such,  cost  data  from  Chinese  companies  is 
considered  unreliable  in  international  litigation  (WTO,  2001,  pp.  8–9).  Under 
these circumstances, anti-dumping lawsuits may be adjudicated using cost data 
from  “surrogate”  manufacturers  in  another  country:  common  surrogates  are 
companies from India, Indonesia, and even the United States (p. 9), countries that 
are  generally  uncompetitive  vis-à-vis  China  in  the  worldwide  manufacturing 
export arena. As a result of these conventions, China’s success in contesting anti-
dumping lawsuits is unimpressive.
24  
China’s WTO accession protocol allows for exceptions to the surrogate 
rule  in  anti-dumping  litigation  if  the  litigated  exporter  can  show  that  “market 
economy  conditions”  apply  in  manufacturing  (WTO,  2001,  p.  9).  As  part  of 
establishing  market  economy  conditions,  the  litigated  exporter  is  generally 
required  to  provide  audited  financial  statements  prepared  “in  line  with 
international  accounting  standards,”  i.e.  IFRS  (e.g.,  EC,  2009,  p.  55).  Thus, 
compliance with IFRS can provide a significant advantage to Chinese exporters, 
and in turn, the Chinese economy (from 1995 to 2008, over 20 percent of all anti-
dumping measures worldwide were targeted at China). In fact, since China has 
                                                 
23 For evidence on such benefits see, for example, Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2010).  
24  See,  for  example,  the  World  Trade  Organization’s  statistics  on  anti-dumping  initiations  at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm#statistics.  16 
 
adopted  IFRS-based  standards,  there  have  been  several  successful  cases  of 
Chinese  companies  qualifying  for  market  economy  treatment  on  the  basis  of 
providing  internationally  compliant  financials:  in  one  case  involving  transport 
equipment, the winning exporter was able to reduce import tariffs by nearly 40% 
(EC, 2005, p. 7).
25  
 
4.2. The international political economy of China and the IASB  
 
The considerable anti-dumping benefits from IFRS adoption that can accrue to 
China’s  export-driven  economy  suggest  that  convergence  with  international 
accounting standards is a major priority for the country. However, as discussed 
earlier, the origin and development of IFRS can be traced to EU and, in particular, 
British interests. It is unlikely, therefore, that the IFRS standards coming out of 
London are fully satisfactory to China. Not surprisingly, China has been careful to 
tailor IFRS to its needs, excepting certain provisions when crafting its domestic 
“IFRS-based” standards, and in one particular case, working with the IASB to 
modify IFRS itself to meet Chinese interests. This subsection details some of 
these exceptions and discusses ramifications.  
The  first  such  exception  deals  with  the  reversal  of  asset  impairments, 
which is generally permissible under IFRS. Chinese accounting standards that 
predate IFRS harmonization efforts eschewed impairment reversals, much like 
U.S. GAAP. The policy was justified by the traditional income-statement focus in 
Chinese financial reporting: Chinese investors pay more attention to the income 
statement  at  the  expense  of  the  balance  sheet  (e.g.,  MOF,  2008),  and  several 
formal contracting provisions, including exchange listing and delisting provisions, 
depend almost entirely on reported profits. Given this history, Chinese regulators 
were wary about unleashing impairment reversals as part of IFRS harmonization 
efforts.
26  Doing  so  could  give  companies  the  means  to  manipulate  profits  by 
opportunistically accelerating and reversing impairments. Accordingly, the IFRS-
based  Chinese  Accounting  Standards  (CAS)  limits  impairment  reversals, 
particularly for short-term and intangible assets. 
The  second  IFRS  exception  in  CAS  deals  with  the  use  of  fair-value 
estimates as a basis for accounting. Fair-value accounting has been one of the 
cornerstones of IFRS, and the IASB, at least until the 2008-09 financial crisis, 
was an enthusiastic champion of expanding fair-value use in accounting. China, 
                                                 
25 The United States generally does not allow individual companies from non-market economies to 
qualify for market economy treatment. A recent attempt by the U.S. government to permit such 
treatment for Chinese companies met with resistance from U.S. businesses and was unsuccessful 
(DOC, 2007; ITA, 2007).  
26 See, for example, comments by Shenzhen Stock Exchange officials in Ramanna et al. (2009, pp. 
7–8). 17 
 
by  contrast,  has  been  more  tentative  in  its  commitment  to  fair  values.  For 
example, Biondi and Zhang (2007) through a comparative analysis of IFRS and 
Chinese standards on business combinations provide evidence that that “leading 
[Chinese]  accounting  theorists  and  Chinese  regulatory  authorities”  favor 
traditional  “matching”  principles  over  fair-value  accounting.  The  argument 
advanced  by  some  Chinese  regulators  for  this  hesitancy  is  the  dominance  of 
manufacturing (rather than financial) assets in the economy. Manufacturing assets 
do  not  have  readily  determinable  current-value  estimates.  Moreover,  market 
prices, when available, are unlikely to represent fundamental value due to China’s 
strict  capital  controls  and  weak  information-intermediation  institutions.  Fair-
values,  a  senior  Chinese  regulator  has  argued,  if  unleashed  unbridled,  can 
facilitate  misreporting.  Accordingly,  China  has  been  judicious  in  permitting 
companies the use of fair values. Some Chinese regulators have even argued that 
the fact that fair values play a minimal role in their system is one reason why 
China did not suffer more seriously during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.
27 A 
compelling example of China’s reluctance on fair-value accounting in found in its 
decision to permit the historic-cost-based pooling-of-interests method for business 
combinations (in addition to the fair-value-based purchase method) “despite the 
prohibition  of  this  method  by  both  the  FASB  and  the  IASB”  (Baker,  Biondi, 
Zhang, 2010). 
The third and perhaps most interesting of the Chinese exceptions to IFRS 
is not an exception per se. Rather, it details China’s success in working with the 
IASB to tailor the IFRS on related-party transactions to meet Chinese interests. 
When China signed the IASB convergence statement in 2005, a key issue for the 
MOF in Beijing had been the IFRS standards on disclosure of related parties. 
Several  of  China’s  largest  companies  have  considerable  state  ownership,  and 
according to a strict interpretation of the then standard, IAS 24, many state-owned 
enterprises  would  have  been  considered  related  parties,  and  their  transactions 
related-party transactions. The extent of disclosure required to satisfy the IFRS 
standards  was  simply  unworkable  for  China.  For  a  state-owned  company  to 
disclose all its related-party transactions “would require thousands of pages,” one 
Chinese regulator said (quote due to an official at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
identity withheld, Ramanna et al., 2009, p. 6). Over the course of four years, 
through 2009, Chinese officials at the MOF worked with the IASB to develop a 
new standard for related-party disclosures. (See Figure 1 for a timeline of the 
events leading up to the IASB’s modified position on related-party disclosures.) 
The revised IAS 24, released by the IASB in November 2009, redefines “related 
parties”  to  provide  a  worldwide  “partial  exemption  for  government-related 
entities” (IASB, 2009). 
                                                 
27 Source: interviews with Shanghai Stock Exchange officials, Ramanna et al. (2009, p. 7).  18 
 
 
 
The impact of the IAS 24 change cannot be overstated. As noted earlier, 
the disclosure of related-party transactions is central to maintaining the integrity 
of the “entity concept,” the fundamental idea in accounting that an enterprise’s 
financials are its own. That a country with significant state ownership of industry 19 
 
was able to redefine worldwide accounting standards on an issue that is so central 
to accounting is indicative of China’s growing power in international standard 
setting. The incident can be a harbinger of a growing role for power politics in 
IFRS standard setting as the world grows increasingly multipolar. On this point, 
note that China’s strong central government allows the country to speak with one 
voice when advocating for itself in international forums such as the IASB. Other 
emerging-market  countries  such  as  India  are  less  likely  to  be  successful  in 
international power politics, as the following section discusses.  
The  IFRS  exceptions  in  CAS  have  created,  in  some  circumstances, 
difficulties for China’s exporters in anti-dumping litigation. For example, in a 
recent case involving a Chinese fine-paper manufacturer litigated in the EU, the 
EC ruled against the company despite it having demonstrated on paper “market 
economy conditions” (including providing audited financials in accordance with 
CAS). As part of its justification for the ruling, the EC noted differences between 
IFRS and CAS, and expressed skepticism about China’s “claimed equivalence” 
between the standards (EC, 2010, p. 12). Decisions such as this are likely to rouse 
China into adopting a more active role at the IASB, so that it can reduce the IFRS 
exceptions it currently carves out in CAS to meet local interests.
28   
 
 
5. Bigger fish from smaller ponds: the case of Tata Steel in India 
 
5.1. Accounting and globalization at Tata Steel   
 
This subsection describes a critical accounting challenge faced by Tata Steel, one 
of India’s largest and most international companies, as it embarks on an ambitious 
phase of globalization. The Tata Steel experience provides an example of the 
complexities that can emerge as business operations, accounting standards, and 
national economic policy globalize at different paces. The following subsection 
explores the implications of the Tata experience for the calculus of IFRS in India 
and other countries with similar or less international power.  
Tata Steel, described by Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh as (PIB, 
2008) “the unique temple of modern India,” is one of India’s oldest, largest, and 
most  respected  companies.  Its  history,  dating  to  the  1800s,  is  tied  to  the 
industrialization of India itself, and as such, the company and its parent, Tata 
Group,  enjoy  a  near  exalted  status  in  the  Subcontinent.  Over  the  past  twenty 
years,  the  company  has  been  globalizing  aggressively,  in  part  to  maintain  its 
competitive position given the liberalization of India’s economy. In 2007, Tata 
Steel  acquired  UK-based  Corus  Steel  for  $12.1  billion,  in  what  was  then  the 
                                                 
28 A less likely scenario is that China avoids creating domestic carve-outs to IFRS.   20 
 
largest acquisition by an Indian company. The Corus deal catapulted Tata Steel 
from ranking as the world’s 56th largest steelmaker to a place among the top ten 
(e.g., Moneycontrol, 2007).  
Tata Steel funded the Corus acquisition in part through a $6.2 billion loan 
issued by its UK subsidiary. It planned to service the debt through the cash flows 
of its European operations, which transacted largely in euros. Thus, as part of a 
hedging strategy (to hedge against foreign-currency risk), Tata Steel denominated 
the bulk of the debt in euros, an operational hedge (Tata Steel, 2008).
29 However, 
Tata Steel’s consolidated financials, prepared under a version of Indian Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (IGAAP) that was harmonizing with IFRS, could 
not recognize the operational hedge. IGAAP, like IFRS, mandated that foreign 
currency  loans  be  translated  into  an  entity’s  functional  (home)  currency  for 
reporting purposes. Accordingly, the Corus loan was expressed in Indian rupees 
in Tata Steel’s consolidated financial statements. With the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2008–09 and the subsequent appreciation of the euro against the rupee, 
this accounting treatment had led to the loan amount increasing by $630 million 
on Tata Steel’s balance sheet (a portion of this increase was amortized in Tata 
Steel’s income statement for the year). $630 million represented about 6.4% of 
Tata Steel’s net debt for the year ending 2009, and about 64% of its net income.  
The IFRS requirement to translate foreign debt into a reporting entity’s 
home  currency  is  less  troubling  to  U.S.  and  European  companies  that  can 
effectively avoid the requirement by raising home-currency-denominated debt on 
world markets. But Tata Steel, as an Indian multinational, finds it difficult to raise 
rupee-denominated  debt  abroad  because  the  Indian  rupee,  due  to  government-
imposed  capital  controls,  is  not  freely  available  overseas.  The  translation 
requirement presents Tata Steel with difficult options. It can: (1) switch the entire 
company’s functional currency to euros, but that will expose the Indian operations 
to currency fluctuations; (2) ignore the translation impact and hope equity and 
debt investors do the same, but this approach does not help address covenants that 
might be triggered by the currency fluctuations; (3) engage in relatively costly 
lobbying  with  the  IASB;  (4)  lobby  Indian  standard  setters  to  create  an  IFRS 
exception in IGAAP for situations such as this.  
Options (1) and (2) are unlikely to be economically viable for Tata Steel. 
Moreover, the company, as one of India’s largest firms, has a history of leadership 
in guiding corporate regulation, including accounting standards, within India (see, 
                                                 
29 Hedging in corporations refers to the practice of lowering firm exposure to uncertain events 
such as fluctuations in exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. Hedging strategies 
can  broadly  be  thought  of  as  “operational”  or  “financial.”  Operational  hedges  lower  risks  by 
restructuring real transactions (such as in the Tata Steel case where the loan was restructured as a 
euro-denominated loan). Financial hedges do not alter real transactions; they usually involve the 
purchase and sale of derivative instruments as offsets to the real risks.  21 
 
for  example,  the  description  of  Tata  Steel’s  successful  attempt  at  changing 
accounting standards for employee severances in Ramanna and Tahilyani, 2010, 
p. 3). Thus, options (3) and (4) are likely to be more palatable to the company. 
With option (3), however, Tata Steel is likely to run up against several more-
powerful interests, such as EU, U.S., and Chinese interests (the latter benefiting 
from a dollar-fixed exchange rate), and is thus unlikely to prevail. This process of 
elimination leaves the company with option (4) as the most practicable course of 
action. The implications of option (4) for the calculus of IFRS harmonization in 
India are the focus of the next subsection.  
 
5.2. The calculus of IFRS in India  
 
Since at least the early 2000s, India’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) has 
issued accounting standards that are based on IFRS. When formulating standards, 
the ASB departs from IFRS only in unavoidable cases, usually when conflicts 
exist with the legal or regulatory framework prevailing in the country. In 2007, 
India announced that it would go a step further and achieve formal “convergence” 
with IFRS by 2011 (IASB, 2007). As in the case of Canada, the large global 
auditing  firms  supported  this  decision.  Kumar  Dasgupta,  a  partner  at 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers  in  India,  explained  the  rationale  (Ramanna  and 
Tahilyani, 2010, p. 6): “There is anecdotal evidence from our clients that they do 
get  easier  access  to  cross-border  finance  if  they  are  using  IFRS  because  on 
occasion  the  credibility  of  Indian  GAAP  as  a  standalone  measure  can  be 
questioned.” 
Although India’s 2008 convergence roadmap envisioned that the country’s 
largest companies would be IFRS compliant by April 2011, the goal remained 
unmet as the date passed. In the past two years, India has had to postpone its 
convergence deadlines twice (Tiwari and Sanyal, 2010; MCA, 2011). In part, the 
delays can be attributed to fundamental differences between IFRS and IGAAP 
that are difficult to reconcile. One such difference is in the area of depreciation. 
Under IGAAP, depreciation is either at rates based on an asset’s estimated useful 
life or on statutory depreciation rates that the country’s Companies Act prescribes, 
whichever is higher. The effect is a mandatory minimum depreciation rate. IFRS, 
in contrast, has no concept of a minimum rate of depreciation: depreciation is 
based  on  the  number  of  years  an  entity  is  expected  to  use  the  asset.  The 
conservatism  introduced  by  IGAAP  in  this  and  other  contexts  is  often  well 
regarded by domestic investors. Sarju Simaria, a senior executive at Edelweiss 
Capital, a large financial services company, noted (Ramanna and Tahilyani, 2010, 
pp.  5–6):  “On  some  policies,  we  are  better  placed  in  terms  of  what  is  being 
proposed by IFRS, and one of them is conservatism… Conservatism is a good 
policy particularly in an environment where you don’t have a mature market…” 22 
 
The  delays  in  implementing  India’s  convergence  timetable  can  also  be 
attributed to political concerns about the nature and priorities of IFRS. On the 
subject of accounting for foreign currency translations, Y. H. Malegam, chairman 
of  India’s  National  Advisory  Committee  on  Accounting  Standards  noted 
(Ramanna and Tahilyani, 2010, p. 7), “If the U.S. borrows money abroad, often it 
will denominate that borrowing in dollars, therefore eliminating the translation 
impact. However, if India borrows money abroad they have to denominate it in 
sterling,  [in]  dollars,  or  in  euros,  leading  to  a  translation  impact  and  creating 
unnecessary volatility. An [Indian] company, which has dollar borrowings, and 
dollar earnings, can repay the loan from its dollar earnings; the exchange rate 
during  the  period  of  the  loan  [should  be]  irrelevant.”  Recognizing  that  the 
political interests shaping IFRS do not always line up with Indian interests, C.B. 
Bhave, India’s chief securities regulator noted (Ramanna and Tahilyani, 2010, p. 
8), “The path [I see] is towards convergence and we must go down the path in a 
gradual manner. We speak English, but we speak Indian English. We understand 
British English and American English but we still prefer to speak Indian English.”  
An alternative approach to “gradual” convergence for countries like India 
is  to  adopt  China’s  policy  of  engaging  the  IASB  directly  in  shaping  IFRS, 
particularly in areas of national interest. Historically though, India has adopted a 
passive mindset to international affairs rooted in a “soft power” identity (e.g., 
Khanna, 2007, p. 252). This policy can be traced to India’s first prime minister, 
Jawaharlal  Nehru,  who  advocated  a  cold-war  foreign  policy  based  on  “non-
alignment,” “non-aggression, non-intervention, mutual benefit and equality, and 
peaceful co-existence” (see, for example, the Sino-India Treaty of 1954, UNO, 
1958, p. 70).
30 Moreover, even if India decides to engage the IASB, it is unclear 
whether it has the political power necessary to steer policy at an international 
level. India, despite substantial economic growth over the past decade, is still 
generally  considered  well  behind  China  in  international  standings  (e.g.,  The 
Economist, 2010). Moreover, unlike in China where the MOF serves as the nodal 
and ultimate decision authority on accounting matters (e.g., World Bank, 2009), 
India’s  accounting  landscape  is  dotted  with  an  alphabet  soup  of  regulatory 
agencies,  professional  organizations,  think  tanks,  and  industry  groups  (see: 
Ramanna and Tahilyani, 2010, for a description of these bodies; and Figure 2 for 
a  list  of  regulatory/  statutory  agencies  with  input  into  IGAAP):  The  high 
coordination costs and differing interests of these organizations make it difficult 
for  an  Indian  lobbying  position  to  have  unified  domestic  support  on  the 
international stage.  
 
                                                 
30 China was also an official signatory to this policy of passivity; but, as historians and political 
scientists have noted, China has in practice adopted a more assertive stance in foreign policy (e.g., 
Kissinger, 2011).    23 
 
 
 
To  summarize,  while  there  is  a  compelling  economic  argument  for  a 
country like India to adopt IFRS, differences between the political priorities of the 
IASB and those of India can delay convergence. One solution to this situation is 
for the country to engage the IASB more directly in standard-setting discussions, 
but  it  is  unclear  whether  India  has  the  power  necessary  to  break  through  the 
established interest groups at the IASB.  
Another  potential  solution  to  the  situation  described  above  is  cross-
country  regional  alliances  or  coalitions,  either  by  countries  themselves  or  by 
companies with similar concerns. At the country level, such coalitions are already 
beginning to form: the Asia-Oceania Standard Setters Group (AOSSG) being a 
prominent example. The AOSSG was established in 2009 and is composed of 
accounting standard setters from countries in the region.
31 Ostensibly, the group 
exists to “leverage the knowledge” of its member states on financial reporting 
issues  and  “share  experiences  on  implementation”  of  IFRS  across  the  region 
(AOSSG,  2011).  On  a  day-to-day  basis,  the  AOSSG  operates  through  several 
working groups focused on substantive areas, such as financial instruments, fair 
values, and revenue, with member states taking the lead on one or more working 
                                                 
31 As of August 2012, the member states of the AOSSG are: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, 
Dubai, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Nepal,  New  Zealand,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  Saudi  Arabia,  Singapore,  Sri  Lanka,  Thailand, 
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 24 
 
groups. The working groups “monitor” the IASB, issue comment letters on IASB 
exposure drafts, and draw the IASB’s attention to AOSSG positions.
32 Little is 
known about the political economy of the AOSSG; the process of forming the 
working groups and appointing their leaders; the effectiveness of the working 
groups in managing the diverse interests of their constituencies and in shaping 
IASB policy. This is likely to be a fruitful area for further study.  
 
 
6. The international politics of IFRS harmonization 
 
6.1. An inductive framework   
 
Sections  2  through  5  all  sketch  out  important  elements  that  contribute  to  an 
understanding  of  the  international  political  dynamics  of  countries’  IFRS 
harmonization decisions. Section 2 describes the central role of the EU and, in 
particular, British interests in the establishment and operation, thus far, of the 
IASB. The IASB can trace its origins to British-led international collaborations on 
accounting matters. These antecedent organizations were more consultative than 
legislative,  and  thus,  did  not  expressly  produce  accounting  standards  for 
international consumption. However, they did lay the groundwork upon which the 
IASB was constituted. A key event in the conception of the IASB was the EU’s 
desire to have one region-wide set of accounting standards; the IASB allowed the 
EU  to  project  that  vision  worldwide.  Since  its  establishment,  the  IASB  has 
remained close to the EU, the latter’s underwriting being an important element in 
the legitimacy and growth of IFRS across the globe. But the board’s closeness to 
the  EU  has  come  with  strings  attached:  a  recent  example  involved  the  IASB 
suspending an evolving reputation for due process in acquiescence to European 
banking interests during 2008–09 financial crisis. This play of events led at least 
one British parliamentarian to refer to the board as “spineless” (Leone, 2008).  
Section 3 describes the seemingly perplexing decision of Canada to adopt 
IFRS  over  U.S.  GAAP.  Canada  in  2005,  in  the  face  of  an  increasingly 
internationalized economy, contemplated supplanting its own domestic GAAP for 
that of either its closest neighbor or the IASB. There were, and continue to be, 
strong economic arguments for Canadian adoption of U.S. GAAP: the United 
States is Canada’s largest investor and trade partner. Nevertheless, Canada chose 
to converge with IFRS. The decision can be explained by contrasting Canada’s 
relationships  with  Europe  and  the  United  States.  The  territory  that  constitutes 
Canada  emerged  from  British  and  French  colonies  in  North  America,  and 
Canadian  cultural  ties  to  these  countries  (particularly  Britain)  remain 
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substantial—the dominant cultural traditions in Canada being shaped by British 
settlers. By contrast, Canada enjoys a nuanced relationship with the United States; 
although the two countries have many similarities, the vastly greater size of the 
United States has resulted in the Canadian position being sometimes described in 
the  popular  culture  as  marred  by  an  “inferiority  complex.”  These  juxtaposing 
associations highlight the broader role that a nation’s cultural comfort with the 
dominant authority at the IASB (currently the EU) can play in its decision to 
adopt IFRS.  
China’s process of convergence with IASB standards highlights another 
dimension in the international politics of IFRS harmonization. Section 4 begins 
with  a  description  of  the  unique  economic  pressures  on  Chinese  exporters  to 
present internationally accepted financials: these exporters are routinely subject to 
anti-dumping litigation in their destination markets. By harmonizing with IFRS, 
China’s MOF hoped to create legitimacy around its financials in international 
litigation. But IFRS, shaped to function in markets characterized by well-defined 
monitoring and information processing institutions (such as in Europe or Canada, 
e.g.,  Ball,  2006),  is  not  particularly  well  suited  to  China’s  emerging  market 
conditions. Accounting technologies such as fair value and impairment reversals 
are  seen  by  China’s  MOF  as  perilous.  Moreover,  the  extensive  disclosure  on 
related-party transactions required under IFRS posed a compliance complexity for 
China’s  large  and  interconnected  state-owned  enterprises,  which  typify  that 
country’s economy. To meet the economic demands that drew it towards IFRS, 
but still maintain standards that reflect China’s domestic conditions, the MOF 
adopted a dual process of excepting certain IFRS standards from Chinese GAAP 
and working with the IASB to move IFRS itself closer to Chinese interests. China 
is likely one of the few non-European powers to currently enjoy the international 
standing to pursue the latter element of this strategy; but the notion of IFRS being 
shaped by a multilateral political dynamic is one with important implications for 
the development and growth of the standards.  
Just  as  elements  in  IFRS  are  ill  suited  to  Chinese  markets,  Indian 
companies suffer from some discordance between IFRS as issued by the IASB 
and international standards that would be optimized to their domestic conditions. 
In Section 5, I lay out some accounting challenges faced by Tata Steel, one of 
India’s  largest  companies,  as  it  embarks  on  an  ambitious  program  of 
globalization; the challenges can be traced to the differential pace in globalization 
of India’s accounting standards, its other commercial regulatory provisions, and 
Tata Steel’s own operations. The situation leaves Tata Steel in a position where it 
must either lobby the IASB to amend IFRS itself or seek exemptions from IFRS 
in  Indian  standards.  Both  approaches  are  costly  on  a  number  of  dimensions, 
including  the  coordination  costs  of  lobbying  and  the  cost  of  differentiating 
standards. The costs suggest that there is some ambiguity about the usefulness of 26 
 
IFRS  to  companies  such  as  Tata  and  countries  such  as  India.  Whether  cross-
country regional alliances among companies or countries can be used to defray 
these costs remains an open question.  
  
 
 
From the various field studies abstracted above, I inductively develop a 
framework to analyze how international politics can shape countries’ strategies on 
IFRS harmonization. The framework is shown as a 2x2 matrix in Figure 3. In the 
matrix, the x-axis represents a country’s proximity to the existing political powers 
at  the  IASB,  where  “proximity”  is  essentially  a  distance  metric  on  a  culture 
dimension. Here, “culture” can be understood as “beliefs and preferences that 
vary  systematically  across  [entities]  separated  by  space  (either  geographic  or 
social) or time” (Fernández, 2008).  
The IASB, as it is currently set up, is strongly influenced by EU and, in 
particular,  British  interests;  thus,  Canada,  with  its  Anglo-French  roots,  would 
score high on the x-axis dimension.
33 Note that the dimension is ‘proximity to the 
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to Europe and, in particular, Britain, as argued in Section 3. To objectively verify this claim 
requires an ex-ante metric of culture. There have been numerous attempts to quantify culture in 
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exiting  powers  at  the  IASB,’  not  ‘relative  proximity  to  the  UK/EU  over  the 
United States,’ so scoring Canada highly on the x-axis does not take away from 
its  relation  with  the  United  States.  More  generally,  a  country  can  have  close 
proximity to both the UK and the United States (in fact, this is likely given that 
these  two  countries  are  themselves  close),  but  this  feature  is  not  mutually 
exclusive to being scored highly on the x-axis dimension.  
The matrix’s y-axis represents a country’s potential political power, i.e., 
its ability to shape decisions at the IASB. China, as illustrated by the example of 
related-party transactions described above, would score high on this dimension, as 
would the larger EU member states, such as France, Germany, and the UK. In the 
matrix, the benefits to IFRS adoption are held constant. The benefits include those 
discussed in the context of Canada, China, and India; in particular, the potential to 
lower translation costs to foreign financial-statement users by having a common 
worldwide accounting standard.  
The lower right box in the matrix (Quadrant I) represents countries with 
high proximity to the existing IASB political powers, but low potential political 
power. Besides Canada, I expect countries such as Australia and New Zealand can 
be classified as Quadrant I countries. These countries enjoy close cultural ties to 
the extant powers at the IASB, i.e., the EU and particularly Britain, but are not 
themselves likely to decidedly shape IFRS policy. Assuming translation benefits 
to IFRS adoption, the strategy among this group is to align themselves with the 
existing IASB powers (i.e., Quadrant II countries). By doing so, such countries 
are likely to reap the benefits of IFRS adoption, while being reasonably ensured 
that IFRS standards continue to meet the economic and political conditions of 
their domestic markets.  
Countries  in  the  upper  right  box  (Quadrant  II)  score  high  on  both 
dimensions, and thus, have the greatest incentives to harmonize with IFRS. As 
described  in  Section  2,  these  countries  are  expected  to  take  a  leading  role  in 
setting  and  legitimizing  IFRS.  An  interesting  question  is  whether  countries 
currently in this quadrant can continue to maintain their influence over the IASB 
in the face of competing pressure from other, larger countries such as China and 
from  international  coalitions  such  as  the  AOSSG.  The  EU  itself  (through  its 
collective embrace of IFRS) provides an important vehicle for these countries to 
exercise influence over the IASB, but as discussed later, there are signs of greater 
discordance within the EU vis-à-vis accounting policy, particularly in the wake of 
the 2008–09 financial crisis. On a related point, the United States, which can also 
                                                                                                                                   
the first four dimensions of the Hofstede score, Canada compares with the UK and the EU as 
follows: ‘Power Distance’ or PDI (39, 35, 49), ‘Individualism versus Collectivism’ or IDV (80, 
89, 60), ‘Masculinity versus Femininity’ or MAS (52, 66, 44), ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’ or UAI 
(48, 35, 72). The world averages are: PDI (58), IDV (45), MAS (49), UAI (67). For full details, 
see http://geert-hofstede.com/.   28 
 
be potentially classified as a Quadrant II country, has not formally committed to 
IFRS adoption; rather, the United States enjoys a unique role of hyper-influential 
outsider at the IASB.
34 The reasons for the U.S.’s non-adoption status are too 
numerous to explore fully in this paper, but in the following sub-section I briefly 
address the subject.
35  
The upper left box (Quadrant III) represents countries with low proximity 
to the existing IASB political powers, but high potential political power. China is 
the archetype of such a country. Another possible candidate for this quadrant is 
Japan.  Although,  to  my  knowledge,  Japan  has  not  been  directly  involved  in 
shaping  a  particular  IFRS  standard  to  meet  its  domestic  interests,
36  Japan  has 
demonstrated its ability to do so in another standard-setting arena: defining banks’ 
capital  adequacy  requirements  under  Basel  III.  Hawkins,  Ramanna,  Sato,  and 
Yamazaki (2011) chronicle Japan’s active lobbying during the negotiations over 
Basel III, in particular, to include deferred tax assets in Basel III’s definition of 
Tier 1 capital: without such inclusion, most of the major Japanese banks would 
fail  Basel  III’s  minimum  capital  standards.  Countries  in  Quadrant  III  have 
markets that are institutionally different from those in the EU; thus, as seen in the 
section on China, IASB standards that predominantly reflect European conditions 
are unlikely to be satisfactory to such countries. One natural response for these 
countries is to develop expedient IFRS carve-outs, as China has in the case of fair 
values and impairment reversals. In addition, such countries are also likely to 
gradually exercise their ability to shape IFRS, so as to bring it closer to their 
interests.  The  exercise  of  this  power  is  likely  to  result  in  a  more  multilateral 
IASB; but its implications for the quality of IFRS are less clear (see also Section 
7).  
Finally,  for  countries  in  the  lower  left  box  (Quadrant  IV),  i.e.,  those 
scoring low on both dimensions, the political strategy on harmonization is least 
clear. India has been presented as the case of such a country, scoring low on the y-
axis in part because it as yet lacks the political power of China to shape IFRS and 
in part because its domestic political interests are not as well aligned as China’s to 
speak with a strong voice internationally. But some further explanation is required 
on why India is scored low on the x-axis, particularly since, like Canada, India is 
a former British colony. Indeed it is not unreasonable to argue that India has some 
                                                 
34 As of 2011, over a fifth of the IASB’s board and trustees were American.  
35 Simmons (2001, pp. 609-611) offers a theory to explain U.S. resistance on global accounting 
harmonization  that  is  grounded  in  the  proposition  that  the  U.S.  experiences  “low  negative 
externalities” from such resistance, while other nations have “high incentives to emulate” U.S. 
GAAP.  
36  Former  IASB  chairman  David  Tweedie  acknowledged  the  role  of  the  Japanese  accounting 
standard-setting body in shaping IFRS, calling the body “very influential in the current debates on 
new IFRSs” (ASBJ, 2011). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this quote to my attention. 29 
 
proximity to the UK, given the long colonial history and the fact that Indian legal, 
accounting, and company procedures in place at that country’s independence were 
based in part on British equivalents. But since 1947, India has made significant 
departures in the British traditions it had inherited, even embarking in a 40-year 
experiment in socialism that put it close to the Soviet Union during much of the 
Cold War. Moreover, while Indian corporate procedures are somewhat based on 
British traditions, India has its own indigenous legal and accounting practices that 
go  back  thousands  of  years  (e.g.,  a  discussion  of  accounting  practices  can  be 
found in Kautilya’s Arthashastra, c. 300 BC) And unlike Canada, India is not a 
nation whose dominant cultural traditions are shaped by European immigrants.
37 
Quadrant  IV  countries,  like  Quadrant  III  countries,  find  IFRS  not 
particularly  well  suited  to  their  domestic  conditions.  But  such  countries  are 
unlikely to be able to individually advance their domestic interests at the IASB, so 
harmonizing with IFRS can bring real costs in the intermediate run. The recent 
development of regional standard-setting coalitions in Asia suggests one possible 
solution to the weak-power problem. Whether this solution will be effective in 
practice, especially given the costs of coordination, remains an empirical question 
for future research. 
In  considering  the  empirical  validity  of  the  predictions  from  the 
framework above, recall the caveats discussed in the introduction. The “partial 
equilibrium” nature of the analysis above suggests several other dimensions might 
affect  countries’  IFRS  harmonization  decisions.  One  such  dimension  is  the 
perceived network benefits to IFRS harmonization. Ramanna and Sletten (2011) 
study  the  importance  of  countries’  perceptions  that  they  will  lower  the 
transactions costs to foreign users of financial statements by adopting IFRS. For a 
given country, the authors expect these perceived benefits to increase as more of 
the  country’s  trade  partners  adopt  IFRS;  they  refer  to  perceived  benefits  so 
measured as the network effects of IFRS. The authors find that network effects 
are statistically and economically significant determinants of IFRS adoption after 
controlling for alternative explanations. Of particular interest to the framework in 
this paper, the authors find that perceived network benefits are more significant in 
the IFRS harmonization decisions of smaller countries. These countries are more 
likely to be classified as Quadrant IV countries in Figure 3. Thus, in a more 
general  equilibrium  analysis,  Quadrant  IV  countries  may  be  seen  as  adopting 
IFRS  contrary  to  the  predictions  above,  but  this  decision  can  be  attributed  to 
perceived  network  benefits.
38  Notwithstanding  such  caveats,  it  is  useful  to 
understand  how  international  political  considerations  can  come  to  affect 
                                                 
37 More quantifiably, the first four dimensions of the Hofstede score on India and the UK are as 
follows: PDI (77, 35), IDV (48, 89), MAS (56, 66), UAI (40, 35). The world averages are: PDI 
(58), IDV (45), MAS (49), UAI (67). See http://geert-hofstede.com/. 
38 In this sense, perceived network benefits can be viewed as a third dimension in Figure 3.  30 
 
countries’ IFRS harmonization decisions: as discussed in Section 7, the potential 
influence  of  international  politics  in  IFRS  has  important  implications  for  the 
IASB and for international accounting more broadly.         
 
6.2. The special case of the United States   
 
In this section, I briefly discuss the special case of the United States vis-à-vis 
IFRS  and  the  IASB.  The  United  States  is  at  once  one  of  the  IASB’s  most 
powerful constituents and most reluctant endorsers. Relatedly, U.S. adoption of 
IFRS is likely to both increase the legitimacy of the standards and decrease the 
incentives for other nations to adopt them (the latter because U.S. adoption is 
likely to result in IFRS taking on the litigation-proof character currently seen in 
U.S. GAAP). Adding to these contradictions, IFRS continues to be shaped by 
American interests (particularly given the convergence efforts between the FASB 
and IASB since 2002), all while U.S. GAAP remains the only potential alternative 
to IFRS on the international stage. Below, I expand on these points.  
Since  its  establishment  in  2001,  the  IASB  has  intended  for  IFRS  to 
become recognized in the United States. Organizationally, the IASB has been 
designed  to  be  similar  to  the  FASB.    Such  similarity,  it  was  believed,  would 
improve the chances of the United States eventually adopting IFRS (Benston et 
al.,  2006,  p.  230).  Americans  also  have  broad  representation  across  IASB 
structures: As of late 2010, four of the fifteen board members, five of the twenty 
trustees,  and  the  foundation’s  top  staffer,  its  chief  operating  officer,  were  all 
American  (e.g.,  Ramanna,  Misztal,  and  Beyersdorfer,  2011).  No  other  nation 
enjoys this level of representation on the IASB. It is reasonable to conclude that 
had the United States adopted IFRS, it would be classified a Quadrant II country. 
(Relatedly,  the  survey  and  empirical  evidence  in  Büthe  and  Mattli,  2011,  are 
consistent with a central role for U.S. interests in IFRS standard setting.) 
A first step toward a U.S. commitment to IFRS was made in 2002, when 
the FASB and IASB pledged to make their accounting standards “compatible” 
(Benston et al., 2006, p. 230). From 2002 to 2007, the bodies “converged” on 
issues such as accounting for changes in accounting standards, accounting for 
error corrections, and accounting for share-based compensation (e.g., Langmead 
and Soroosh, 2009). In recognition of the progress achieved, in 2007, the U.S. 
Securities  &  Exchanges  Commission  (SEC)  lifted  the  requirement  for  foreign 
companies  listed  in  the  United  States  to  provide  U.S.  GAAP  financials,  and 
allowed their alternative use of IFRS (SEC, 2007). In 2008, the SEC voted for an 
updated convergence roadmap proposing a switch to a single set of standards for 
all  U.S.  companies  by  2014,  with  a  final  decision  scheduled  for  2011  (SEC, 
2008). Since then, however, the world has endured a major financial crisis that 
has significantly altered the political economy of U.S. capital markets. Moreover, 31 
 
a changed presidential administration and a changed SEC leadership since 2008 
mean that prior American commitments to IFRS are less likely to be upheld. Not 
surprisingly then, in July, 2012, the SEC issued a staff report that effectively 
delayed the possibility of U.S. adoption of IFRS indefinitely (SEC, 2012).  
Beyond immediate political-economic considerations tied to the fallout of 
the  2008–09  financial  crisis,  American  political  reservations  on  IFRS  can  be 
traced to a longstanding popular-cultural belief in American “exceptionalism,” a 
phrase probably attributable to de Tocqueville, who referred to the adolescent 
nation  he  scrutinized  in  his  influential  1835  tome  as  “exceptional”  (2004,  pp. 
517–518). But the sentiment likely traces even further into American history, to 
the earliest British settlers: John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, referred to the community he was to lead in 1630 as a “city upon a 
hill,”  a  belief  since  reaffirmed  by  American  presidents  as  diverse  as  John 
Kennedy and Ronald Reagan (e.g., Kennedy, 1961; Reagan, 1989). Relatedly, 
Thomas Jefferson’s inauguration address in 1801 called for “honest friendship 
with  all  nations,  [but]  entangling  alliances  with  none”  (Jefferson,  2006). 
American exceptionalism has manifested itself in international policy on issues as 
substantial as the U.S.’s rebuff of the League of Nations after World War I to 
those as parochial as America’s refusal to adopt the metric system (together only 
with  Liberia  and  Myanmar).  An  ironic  and  serendipitous  byproduct  of  such 
exceptionalism, if it does in fact result in an indefinite American holdout to IFRS, 
is  that  the  FASB  can  offer  some  competition  in  ideas  to  its  London-based 
counterpart:  Several  academics  have  argued  that  adopting  IFRS  in  the  United 
States  could  impede  innovation  in  accounting  standard-setting,  since  such  an 
adoption  would  virtually  guarantee  the  IASB  a  worldwide  monopoly  over 
accounting issues (e.g., Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner, 2010, and cites therein).  
But, as engaging as the idea of U.S. GAAP as an alternative to IFRS may 
be, it is pertinent to note that the SEC does not seek the adoption of its accounting 
standards overseas. Moreover, the empirical evidence on the political economy of 
U.S.  GAAP  points  to  the  role  of  domestic  interests;  I  am  not  aware  of  any 
systematic evidence suggesting international interests shaping outcomes in U.S. 
GAAP.  The  latter  is  likely  to  serve  as  a  disincentive  to  foreign  countries 
considering adoption of American standards (also see the earlier discussion on 
Canada).   
To summarize, the United States presents a unique case in the study of the 
international  political  dynamics  of  IFRS.  The  United  States  is  at  once  a  key 
influence at the IASB (very likely qualifying as a Quadrant II country if it adopted 
IFRS), but still an outsider in the sense of its ongoing reluctance to commit to the 
international  standards.  Thus,  the  United  States  is  simultaneously  regarded  as 
shaping IFRS, while offering, in U.S. GAAP, an alternative to IFRS.  
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7. Discussion 
 
7.1. Implications for IFRS-related issues in practice 
 
The political considerations that can shape IFRS harmonization, as highlighted in 
the preceding sections, are important for the future of the IASB. As evident from 
the  discussions  above,  the  nature  of  countries’  commitments  to  IFRS  varies 
considerably with political-economy considerations. A few countries, including 
Australia and Canada, have adopted IFRS with almost no exceptions. Some other 
countries require IFRS only for certain segments of the economy (e.g., banks). 
Still  other  countries,  such  as  China  and  India,  have  engaged  in  an  often-
ambiguous process known as IFRS “convergence.” Because national standard-
setters define the extent of “convergence,” two countries that the IASB identifies 
as IFRS-convergent can have very different standards in practice. 
The  emergence  and  growth  of  convergence-based  approaches  to  IFRS 
harmonization, especially among larger emerging-market nations such as China 
and  India,  raise  interesting  questions  for  the  future  of  IFRS.  On  one  hand, 
convergence-based IFRS harmonization can be viewed as posing a serious threat 
to  the  conceptual  goal  of  one  global  accounting.  Advocates  of  adoption  over 
convergence, represented visibly by the IASB itself and the Big Four audit firms, 
argue that fully replacing local GAAP with IFRS is the more effective way to 
ensure international comparability of financial statements (e.g., Sweeney, 2009). 
Incoming  IASB  vice-chairman  Ian  Mackintosh  notes  (Kranacher,  2010a): 
“Convergence is [an] impossible dream. You will always find issues where you 
basically don’t agree and where both sides have good reasons for not agreeing. 
You’ve just got to make a decision. Fiddling with IFRS [locally] is not the way 
forward.” Convergence champions, on the other hand, stress the need to remain 
flexible and adjust accounting rules to domestic political economies. They argue 
that such adaptability of accounting to local needs leads to a better understanding 
of  local  business  performance.
39  In  addition,  convergence  is  viewed  as  more 
politically palatable given concerns about surrendering jurisdictional sovereignty 
to a Euro-dominated IASB (e.g., Sweeney, 2009). Thus, convergence, with its 
emphasis on realpolitik, can be seen as a pragmatic solution to the otherwise high 
political barriers to globalized accounting. Resisting convergence can have the 
perverse effect of increasing the role of power politics in IFRS standard setting. 
Without  a  convergence  option,  Quadrant  III  countries  may  be  more  likely  to 
engage the IASB to align IFRS with their interests.  
                                                 
39 See, for example, the quotes from several Chinese officials reported in Ramanna et al. (2009). 33 
 
In addition to the procedural concern illustrated by the convergence versus 
adoption  debate,  the  financial  crisis  of  2008–09  has  uncovered  substantive 
differences across countries around IFRS. The substantive differences deal largely 
with  fair-value  accounting,  a  practice  with  which  the  IASB  has  been  closely 
identified since its inception. The differences on fair value are suggestive of a 
fissure within the EU consensus that has underwritten the IASB for the past ten 
years. The first major dissonance on fair values started in 2003, when the EU 
prepared to vote on finalizing IFRS adoption. At the time, French and German 
banking interests protested the mark-to-market character of the IAS 32 and IAS 
39  regulations  on  financial  instruments,  demanding  influence  to  reshape  the 
proposal (e.g., Parker, 2003). Five EU member states—Belgium, France, Italy, 
Portugal,  and  Spain—joined  in  to  express  reservations  on  IAS  39;  their  most 
prominent advocate being then French president Jacques Chirac (e.g., Brackney 
and Witmer, 2005). This pressure was successful in delaying the adoption of both 
standards in the EU. In the wake of the 2008–09 financial crisis, frictions around 
fair  values  in  IFRS  have  intensified.  The  rules  on  hedge  accounting  are  one 
example. On one side are France, Germany, and the European Central Bank who 
resist the introduction of more mark-to-market principles (e.g., Sanderson, 2009). 
“Stability is part of the quality of standards,” notes Jérôme Haas, head of the 
French accounting standards body (Jones, 2009). This group considers the 2008–
09 financial crisis to be primarily caused by illiquidity in financial markets, and so 
views promoting post-crisis stability as paramount. On the other side, the UK, 
with its traditional faith in capital market institutions, is seen as promoting greater 
transparency in financial reporting through increased fair-value use (especially for 
impairment)  as  a  more  appropriate  post-crisis  accounting  response  (e.g., 
Chancellor, 2008). A fissure within the EU on an issue as substantive as fair 
values can open the door for more emerging-market economies to play a defining 
role  at  the  IASB.  As  a  practical  matter,  it  may  result  in  more  Quadrant  IV 
countries (such as India) being reclassified as Quadrant III countries.  
A  manifestation  of  this  coming  reclassification  of  countries  across 
quadrants can be seen in the results of the IASB’s 2010 constitutional review, 
which  included  guidelines  to  ensure  a  broader  international  basis  for  board 
membership.
40 Supporters of reform have sometimes criticized the board’s Anglo-
centric  orientation.
41  David  Tweedie,  himself,  has  acknowledged  this  in  an 
interview (Kranacher, 2010b), “Currently on the board are people from South 
Africa,  Australia,  the  UK,  and  America;  at  least  half  of  the  board  is  Anglo-
American,  and  we  [all]  account  basically  the  same  way.”  The  constitutional 
                                                 
40 Ramanna, Misztal, and Beyersdorfer (2011) discuss the constitutional review in more detail.  
41 For example, across a series of interviews with German accountants, Heidhues and Patel (2011) 
provide evidence of a German perception of Anglo-centric bias at the IASB. See also, Botzem and 
Quack (2009).  34 
 
review has prescribed broader geographic diversity for an enlarged board of 16 by 
2012:  four  members  from  Europe,  four  members  from  North  America,  four 
members from the Asia/Oceania region, one member from Africa, one member 
from  South  America,  and  two  members  appointed  from  any  area  subject  to 
maintaining  overall  geographical  balance  (IFRS  Foundation,  2009).  These 
reforms are likely to reduce the influence of British and European interests at the 
IASB, which in turn can encourage countries to reassess both their proximity to 
existing political powers at the IASB and their own potential political power at 
the IASB. (Note that IASB members are not formally required to represent their 
home countries’ interests while serving on the board.) 
Finally, there is the issue of the U.S.’s position on IFRS, a topic briefly 
addressed in the previous section. As noted earlier, the United States, without 
formally committing to IFRS, remains influential on the IASB. How, if at all, is 
the framework developed in this paper affected given the recent SEC staff report 
rejecting full IFRS adoption in the foreseeable future? Particularly in light of the 
IASB’s  organizational  reforms  discussed  above,  I  expect  the  U.S.’s  relative 
influence on the IASB to decline. However, even in this case, U.S. participation in 
the IASB is likely to remain a significant source of legitimacy for IFRS, so it is 
unlikely that major U.S. interests will be altogether marginalized. (On this point, 
consider the following comment from IASB founding chairman David Tweedie in 
Kranacher, 2010b, “We can have international standards, but we will never have 
global standards without the United States… It would be very difficult for the rest 
of the world to accept [IFRS] if the United States said, ‘We are not going to do 
this.’”) 
 
7.2. Research implications 
 
Beyond issues in practice, the paper’s analysis of international political dynamics 
in IFRS harmonization raises interesting questions for future academic research. 
In particular, if international politics plays a significant role in shaping countries’ 
IFRS harmonization strategies, does that make the international standards more or 
less effective as an institution of global governance? On one hand, a technocratic 
view of accounting advocates resisting political interference in standard setting 
decisions (e.g., Barth, 2006). Under this view, a politicized IFRS harmonization 
process can be indicative of compromised legitimacy of IFRS.
42 On the other 
hand,  an  evolving  political-science  literature  on  global  governance  institutions 
suggests an active cross-country political dynamic can be important to creating 
                                                 
42 On standard setters’ desires to “legitimate” themselves, Young (2003) notes how the FASB 
engages in “rhetorical strategies” to ensure that its standards are seen (p. 637) “as emergent from a 
rational process that separates the technical and political rather than as the result of the desires or 
wants of a particular agent or a process of accommodation.” 35 
 
legitimacy for international organizations (e.g., Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). 
Under this view, a vibrant role for international politics in IFRS harmonization is 
an affirmative sign for IFRS. The framework I present here cannot resolve these 
competing arguments, but it can provide some basis for further work evaluating 
the effectiveness of international accounting as a conceptual idea. Ultimately, we 
must  learn  whether  the  political  process  underlying  IFRS  facilitates  the 
production  of  economically  efficient  standards.  (This  debate  transcends 
international  accounting  and  applies  to  accounting  more  generally.  In  fact, 
addressing this debate is one of the fundamental objectives of the Convivium: See 
Biondi, 2011, and Sunder, 2011. Baker et al., 2010, begin to develop a framework 
to address these questions.) 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Over  the  2001–2010  period,  about  100  countries  have  in  varying  degrees 
committed  themselves  to  the  globalization  of  accounting  through  IFRS 
harmonization. The spread of IFRS worldwide is a complex phenomenon likely 
involving  the  understanding  of  numerous  interweaving  economic  and  political 
forces. In this paper, I offer an analysis of some international political dynamics 
of IFRS harmonization. While international politics is not the only or even the 
deciding element in understanding the growth of IFRS, it is likely to be important.  
The analysis in this paper is based on field studies of three jurisdictions: 
Canada,  China,  and  India.  Across  these  jurisdictions,  I  first  describe  unique 
elements of domestic political economies that are shaping their IFRS policies. 
Then,  I  inductively  isolate  two  principal  dimensions  that  can  be  used  to 
characterize these jurisdictions’ IFRS responses: proximity to existing political 
powers at the IASB; and own potential political power at the IASB. Based on how 
countries  are  classified  along  these  dimensions,  I  offer  predictions,  ceteris 
paribus, on their IFRS harmonization strategies. 
The  analysis  in  this  paper  helps  in  the  understanding  of  accounting 
globalization. Moreover, a knowledge of the international political dynamics of 
countries’  IFRS  responses  can  be  useful  to  the  international  standard-setting 
community as IFRS enters its second decade. Fundamental questions in IASB 
policy that are likely to be informed by international politics remain unanswered. 
For  example,  should  the  IASB  put  more  emphasis  on  convergence  over  full 
adoption in promoting IFRS use? Should the IASB make accommodations to its 
organizational structure to facilitate U.S. adoption? Should the IASB make further 
adjustments  to  its  governance  to  accommodate  its  growing  membership  and 
stakeholder base? The analysis in the paper has implications for these questions, 
but more research in the political process of the IASB is needed. 36 
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